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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Mario Ruiz was found guilty of a single count of trafficking in 
more than 28 grams of methamphetamine. He received a unified sentence of ten years, 
with three years fixed. On appeal, he contends that his conviction and sentence should 
be vacated, and his case remanded for a new trial, because, at trial, the district court 
erred in limiting his cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
During the summer of 2005, police working through a then-confidential informant, 
Megan Larsen, arranged to purchase approximately two ounces of methamphetamine 
from a young man named Josh Morrison. (See Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.17, ~.6. ) '  Mr. 
Morrison was a drug dealer who was known to have supplied drugs to Ms. Larsen 
previously. (Tr., p.143, L.20 - p.144, L.7.) 
On August 11, 2005, the date of the controlled buy, the police set Ms. Larsen up 
with "a wire," followed her as she went to meet Mr. Morrison, then followed Ms. Larsen 
and Mr. Morrison as they drove Ms. Larsen's vehicle to a different location, ostensibly to 
meet Mr. Morrison's supplier. (See Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.20, L.19 (testimony of Detective 
McDaniel), p. 148, L. 13 - p. 152, L.24 (testimony of Ms. Larsen), p. 130, L. 1 1 - p. 133, L.5 
(testimony of Deputy Waithall).) After Ms. Larsen and Mr. Morrison parked in a Fred 
Meyer parking lot, officers observed Ms. Larsen get out of the vehicle and a man with a 
' There are two separately-bound transcripts in the record in this case. The original transcript (containing 
the bulk of Mr. Ruiz's trial, as well as his sentencing hearing) is referenced herein as "Tr." The alter- 
prepared supplemental transcript (containing the jury selection and opening arguments from the first day 
of trial) is not cited herein. 
dark complexion get in. (Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.24, p.135, L.2 - p.136, L.13.) After a 
short time, the man with the dark complexion got out, Ms. Larsen got back in, 
Ms. Larsen dropped Mr. Morrison off at his car, and Ms. Larsen met the officers to turn 
over the nearly two ounces of methamphetamine she had purchased from Mr. Morrison 
-p.23, L.4, p.136, L.6-p.139, L . l l . )  
On August 23, 2005, the police arrested Mr. Morrison. (Tr., p.66, Ls.17-19, p.69, 
Ls.6-9.) Mr. Morrison was charged with trafficking in more than 28 grams of 
methamphetamine (Tr., p.60, Ls.16-21), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence 
of three years fixed and allows for a life sentence, I.C. 3 37-2732B(a)(4). Immediately 
after being arrested, Mr. Morrison told the police that his "supplier" was someone 
named "Jared," but, when asked by the police about someone named "Mario," 
Mr. Morrison implicated Mario Ruiz in the August 11, 2005 controlled buy. (Tr., p.69, 
L.6 - p.70, L.22, p.94, L.6 - p.95, L.4.) 
On August 24, 2005, Mr. Ruiz was charged with trafficking in more than 28 
grams of methamphetamine. (R., pp.6-7; see also R., pp.16-17.) 
At some point, Mr. Morrison cut a deal with the State whereby he agreed to 
testify against Mr. Ruiz and, in exchange, the State agreed to reduce his charge to 
delivery of a controlled substance2 and to recommend that he be placed on probation. 
(Tr., p.60, L.16 - p.61, L.3, p.79, Ls.19-25.) In accordance with that deal, Mr. Morrison 
did indeed testify against Mr. Ruiz at Mr. Ruiz's trial, identifying Mr. Ruiz as the supplier 
of the methamphetamine involved in the August 11, 2005 controlled buy. (See 
generally Tr., p.59, L.15 - p.102, L.15.) Ultimately, however, Mr. Ruiz was not allowed 
to fully cross-examine Mr. Morrison about his arrangement with the State, as the district 
court forbade defense counsel from asking Mr. Morrison about the mandatory minimum 
fixed prison sentence he would have been facing had he not agreed to cooperate with 
the State. (See Tr., p.74, L.15 - p.77, L.22.) 
At trial, the only other witness to identify Mr. Ruiz as having supplied 
methamphetamine to Mr. Morrison was Ms. Larsen. (See Tr., p.157, Ls.12-17, p.175, 
L.16 - p.176, L.11.)3 However, her testimony is also suspect since she too had much to 
gain by saying what she thought the police wanted to hear. Not only had Ms. Larsen 
received payment from the police for her work as a confidential informant, but she had 
also had her own drug charges dismissed. (Tr., p.147, L.9 - p.148, L.6, p.159, Ls.5-10; 
see also Tr., p.129, L.16 - p.130, L.10 (Deputy Walthall testifying that no explicit 
promises were made to Ms. Larsen, but that it was made clear that if she were to assist 
the police in "work[ingJ up the ladder," "recommendations" would be made to the 
prosecutor on her case).) Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury found 
Mr. Ruiz guilty. (R., p.39.) 
On April 28, 2006, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (See generally 
R., pp.56-57; Tr., p.216, L . l  - p.230, L.7.) Ultimately, the district court imposed upon 
Mr. Ruiz a sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (R., p.59.) The district court 
filed its Judgment of Conviction and Commitment on May 1, 2006. (R., pp.58-60.) 
Delivery of a controlled substance carries a maximum punishment of life in prison, but it has no 
mandatory minimum sentence, much less a mandatory minimum sentence with a requirement that that 
minimum sentence be fixed. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(l)(A). 
Two police officers testified at Mr. Ruiz's trial about having "surveilled" the controlled buy, but neither 
officer could identify Mr. Ruiz as the man with the dark complexion who met with Mr. Morrison. (See 
Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.24 (Detective McDaniel testifying that he could see Mr. Morrison and Ms. Larsen, 
initially, but that his view was then obstructed by a large SUV), p.135, L.23 - p.136, L.13 (Deputy Walthall 
testifying that he could recognize Mr. Morrison and Ms. Larsen, and that he could see a "dark complected 
. . . male" approach Ms. Larsen's vehicle).) 
On May 1 I, 2006, Mr. Ruiz timely filed his Notice of ~ p p e a l . ~  (R., pp.62-64.) On 
appeal, Mr. Ruiz contends that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, and his 
case remanded for a new trial, because the district court erred in limiting his 
cross-examination of Mr. Morrison, a key witness for the prosecution. 
4 Mr. Ruiz filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2006. (R., pp.71-73.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court commit reversible error in limiting Mr. Ruiz's cross-examination of a 
key prosecution witness? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Committed Reversible Error In limit in^ Mr. Ruiz's Cross-Examination 
Of A Kev Prosecution Witness 
A. Introduction 
During the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor called Josh Morrison to the 
witness stand. (Tr., p.59, Ls.11-28.) Almost immediately, in what was obviously an 
attempt to pre-empt any impeachment of Mr. Morrison's testimony by the defense, the 
prosecutor himself inquired about the deal that had been struck between Mr. Morrison 
and the State. (See Tr., p.60, L.16 - p.17.) Specifically, the prosecutor elicited 
testimony to the effect that Mr. Morrison had been charged with trafficking in more than 
28 grams of methamphetamine but had reached an agreement with the State whereby, 
in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Ruiz, his trafficking charge would be reduced 
to delivery of a controlled substance, the State would recommend a sentence of 
probation (with some local jail time), and the State would move to have him released on 
his own recognizance. (Tr., p.60, L.16 - p.17.) As noted above, Mr. Morrison then went 
on to implicate Mr. Ruiz. (See generally Tr., p.61, L.18 - p.71, L.20.) 
Later, in the midst of defense counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Morrison, the 
State moved (outside the presence of the jury) to preclude the defense from inquiring 
into the mandatory minimum fixed sentence that Mr. Morrison would have faced had he 
not struck a deal with the State. (Tr., p.74, Ls.15-17.) Defense counsel objected, 
arguing both that such impeachment is "fair game" because the jury should be allowed 
to hear that Mr. Morrison "escapes from three years in the State pen" through his deal 
with the State (Tr., p.76, Ls.2-lo), and that the State had "opened the door" to such 
evidence by questioning Mr. Morrison regarding the terms of the agreement he had 
reached with the State (Tr., p.74, Ls.18-22). Ultimately, however, the district court ruled 
in favor of the State, limiting the defense counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Morrison to 
the fact that a recommendation for probation would be made. (Tr., p.75, L.14 - p.76, 
L.1, p.76, L . l l  - p.77, L.22.) This ruling was based upon the district court's concern 
that the jury not be allowed to infer that Mr. Ruiz was facing a mandatory minimum 
sentence of three years fixed.5 (Tr., p.75, L.14 - p.76, 1.1, p.76, L.11 - p.77, L.22.) 
Based on the district court's ruling, defense counsel inquired of Mr. Morrison 
regarding one of his incentives to testify falsely in effort to please the State-the State's 
promise to recommend that he receive probation (Tr., p.79, Ls.19-23); however, while 
he was able to ask about the "lesser" charge of delivery of a controlled substance 
(Tr., p.79, Ls.13-18), he was not allowed to ask any questions which would have 
allowed the jury to understand why delivery of a controlled substance represented a 
"lesser" charge. Thus, the defense was prevented from apprising the jury of one of 
Mr. Morrison's other major incentives to testify falsely in an effort to please the State- 
the State's promise to take away the requirement that he serve three years in an Idaho 
The district court initially seemed to base its ruling on the mistaken belief that trafficking and delivery 
carry different maximum sentences, apparently reasoning that pointing out these different maximums 
would be adequate to reveal Mr. Morrison's incentive to lie for the State: 
I do think it is appropriate for [defense counsel] to point out that the defendant could 
obtain-could have received a sentence up to life in prison. 
I think that once you talk about a reduction in sentence, the defense has the right 
to explore the extent of that reduction because I believe it goes to the credibility of the 
witness. You can't talk about the minimum mandatories [sic], but you can talk about the 
fact the sentence that he faced could have been up to life. 
(Tr., p.75, Ls.1-I I .) However, after defense counsel pointed out that both the greater charge of trafficking 
in more than 28 grams of methamphetamine and the lesser charge of delivery of methamphetamine carry 
maximum punishments of life in prison (Tr.. p.75, Ls.12-13), the district court appears to shifted to the 
reasoning discussed above. (See Tr., p.75, L.14 - p.77, L.22.) 
prison with no chance of parole should its recommendation of probation be rejected by 
Mr. Morrison's sentencing judge (or should Mr. Morrison's probation ever be revoked). 
As set forth in detail below, Mr. Ruiz contends that the district court's limitation of 
his cross-examination of Mr. Morrison constituted reversible error. Specifically, he 
uling was in error because it violated his Constitutional 
I as ldaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403; he further 
contends that the error was not harmless and, thus, requires that he be granted a new 
trial 
B. Standards Of Review 
Constitutional issues are questions of law over which Idaho's appellate courts 
exercise free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 ldaho I ,  2, 137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006). 
On the other hand, the standard of review applicable to the admission of 
evidence under ldaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 are as follows: 
Separate standards of review apply to issues of admissibility of 
evidence under ldaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. We freely review 
questions of relevancy under I.R.E. 401 because relevancy is a question 
of law. On the question of whether the evidence's probative value is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudicial impact, however, we will 
overturn the trial court's decision only for abuse of discretion. Where a 
matter is committed to the discretion of the trial court, we conduct a three- 
tiered inquiry on appeal. We consider whether: (1) the lower court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Waddle, 125 ldaho 526, 528, 873 P.2d 171, 173 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
C. In Preventina Mr. Ruiz From Fully Cross-Examining A Key Prosecution Witness 
With Reaard To That Witness's Biases. Preiudices. And Ulterior Motives, The 
District Court Violated Mr. Ruiz's Constitutional Riaht To Confront The Witnesses 
Aqainst Him 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that every 
criminal defendant has "the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."6 
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. This right necessarily includes the right to cross-examine 
witnesses: 
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands 
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of 
being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which 
cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and 
obtaining immediate answers. 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence 3 1395, 
p.123 (3d ed. 1940)). 
In discussing a defendant's right to cross-examination under the confrontation 
clause, the United States Supreme Court has described it is the right to have "an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not [the right to] cross-examination that is 
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." 
Delaware V. Fensferer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985) (emphasis in original). The Court has 
repeatedly recognized that such an "opportunity for effective cross-examination" 
includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters relating to the biases, 
prejudices, and ulterior motives that might color the witness's testimony against the 
accused 
"ince the right to confrontation is deemed to be a fundamental right, it is applicable to the states through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965). 
In Davis v. Alaska, for example, the defendant, charged with burglary for 
breaking into a bar and grand larceny for allegedly stealing a safe from that bar, wished 
to cross-examine a critical prosecution witness (whose testimony had placed the 
defendant, with "something like a crowbar" in his hands, near the location where the 
abandoned safe was had been discovered) regarding the fact that that witness, who 
lived nearby, was on juvenile probation for having committed two prior 
burglaries. Davis, 415 U.S. at 309-1 1. The defendant's argument was that such cross- 
examination would reveal two motives for the witness to have misidentified the 
defendant: (I) to shift suspicion away from himself; andlor (2) to give the appearance of 
cooperating with the police and, thus, avoid a retaliatory probation revocation. Id. at 
31 1. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the state trial court had violated the 
defendant's right to confrontation by precluding the defendant's desired cross- 
examination: 
We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the 
credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had 
counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the 
jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them 
so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on 
[the witness's] testimony which provided "a crucial link in the proof. . . of 
petitioner's act." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S., at 419, 85 S.Ct., at 1077. 
The accuracy and truthfulness of [the witness's] testimony were key 
elements in the State's case against petitioner. The claim of bias which 
the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an 
inference of undue pressure because of Green's vulnerable status as a 
probationer, cf. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 
L.M. 624 (1931), as well as of Green's possible concern that he might be 
a suspect in the investigation. 
Id, at 317-18 (footnote omitted) 
Later, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the Court reaffirmed its 
holding from Davis. In Van Arsdall, the defendant had sought to impeach the testimony 
of a prosecution witness by cross-examining that witness about the fact that a criminal 
charge against him had been dismissed after he had agreed to speak to the prosecutor 
about the defendant's case; however, the defendant's proposed cross-examination had 
been barred by the trial court based on Delaware Rule of Evidence 403.' Id. at 676-77. 
The Supreme Court held that the defendants right to confrontation had been violated 
because "a jury might reasonably have found" that the government's dismissal of the 
pending criminal charge "furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in 
his testimony. . . ." Id. at 679. 
Most recently, in Olden v. Kentucky, 488 ldaho 227 (1988), a 
kidnappinglrapelsodomy case in which the defense theory was that the sexual contact 
in question had been purely consensual, the United States Supreme Court, this time in 
a per curiam opinion, held that under Davis and Van Arsdall the defendant's right to 
confrontation had been violated when he was precluded from cross-examining the 
alleged victim about her relationship and subsequent cohabitation with another man. Id. 
at 231-32. The Court reasoned that evidence of the alleged victim's ongoing 
relationship with another man could have demonstrated a motivation for her to concoct 
a rape story to cover up her infidelity. See id. at 229-30, 231-32. 
The ldaho Court of Appeals, adhering to Davis, Van Arsdall, and Olden, have 
likewise recognized that such an "opportunity for effective cross-examinationn includes 
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters relating to any biases, 
prejudices, and ulterior motives that might color their testimony against the accused. 
7 The version of Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 then in effect was substantively identical to the current 
version of ldaho Rule of Evidence 403. (Compare Van Arsdall, 475 U.S, at 676-77 n.2 (quoting the 
Delaware Rule) with I.R.E. 403.) 
See, e.g., State v. Harshbarger, 139 ldaho 287, 293-94, 77 P.3d 976, 982-83 (Ct. App. 
2003) (finding a confrontation clause violation where the district court precluded the 
defendant from cross-examining a government witness regarding felony charges 
against that witness that had been reduced to misdemeanors and eventually dismissed 
because exploration of that topic could have raised an inference that the 
favorably for the State based on her implied understanding or 
expectation of what would happen with regard to her own case); State v. Green, 136 
ldaho 553, 556-57, 38 P.3d 132, 135-36 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding a confrontation clause 
violation where the district court precluded the defendant from cross-examining a 
government witness regarding a felony charge pending against that witness because 
the existence of the charge provided some motivation for the witness to testify to the 
State's liking). 
Mr. Ruiz contends that his case is no different than any of the cases discussed 
above. At trial, Mr. Ruiz sought to cross-examine Mr. Morrison, a critical witness for the 
State, as to the details of Mr. Morrison's plea deal with the State. Obviously, doing so 
would have raised serious questions as to Mr. Morrison's credibility because 
Mr. Morrison's incentive to testify to the State's liking would have been laid bare before 
the jury. Clearly, this is precisely the type of cross examination that must be allowed 
under the confrontation clause. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-32; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 
679; Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-18; Harshbarger, 139 ldaho at 293-94, 77 P.3d at 982-83; 
Green, 136 ldaho at 556-57, 38 P.3d at 135-36. 
However, as noted above, Mr. Ruiz was only allowed to ask about the maximum 
punishment for trafficking in methamphetamine, the fact that Mr. Morrison's charge 
would be reduced from trafficking in more than 28 grams of methamphetamine to the 
"lesser" charge of delivery of methamphetamine, and the State's promise to recommend 
that Mr. Morrison be placed on probation. Mr. Ruiz was not allowed to ask Mr. Morrison 
about his understanding of the mandatory minimum sentence he would be facing under 
a delivery charge (none), as compared to a trafficking in more than 28 grams charge 
(three years, all fixed). Thus, Mr. Ruiz was not allowed to ask Mr. Morrison the critical 
questions that would have allowed the jury to understand why delivery of 
methamphetamine was considered a "lesser" charge, to comprehend just how 
significant it is for a defendant to have his charge reduced from trafficking in more than 
28 grams of methamphetamine to mere delivery of methamphetamine, and, to 
ultimately, appreciate the tremendous incentive for Mr. Morrison to try to please the 
State and, thus, obtain the benefit of the reduced charge. Because, Mr. Ruiz was not 
allowed to explore the biases, prejudices, and ulterior motives that Mr. Morrison had to 
testify favorable for the State, his right to confrontation was denied. Olden, 488 U.S. at 
231-32; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679; Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-18; Harshbarger, 139 
ldaho at 293-94, 77 P.3d at 982-83; Green, 136 ldaho at 556-57, 38 P.3d at 135-36. 
D. In prevent in^ Mr. Ruiz From Fully Cross-Examinina A Key Prosecution Witness 
With Re~ard To That Witness's Biases. Preiudices. And Ulterior Motives, The 
District Court Violated The ldaho Rules Of Evidence 
Although the prosecutor did not explicitly mention the ldaho Rules of Evidence 
when he made his motion to limit Mr. Ruiz's cross-examination of Mr. Morrison, his 
motion appears to have been based on the belief that the subject of punishment is 
never relevant under I.R.E. 401. He argued as follows: "1 don't think there should be 
any mention of mandatory minimums. Penalty is not a concern for the jury."' (Tr., p.74, 
Ls. 15-17 (emphasis added).) 
In ruling on the State's motion, the district court did not explicitly mention the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence either. (See Tr., p.74, L.25 - p.77, L.22.) However, a close 
ruling reveals arly rejected the State' 
ention that the subject of punishment is 
finding that the subject of Mr. Morrison's punishment was relevant to Mr. Morrison's 
credibility. (Tr., p.74, L.25 - p.75, L.8; see also Tr., p.75, Ls.14-19 (allowing defense 
counsel to cross-examine Mr. Morrison with regard to the maximum sentence he could 
receive, as well as the State's promise to recommend probation, p.76, Ls.11-12 (same), 
p.76, L.24 - p.77, L.2 (same), p.77, Ls.7-11 (same).) 
Nevertheless, the district court granted the State's motion, albeit on alternate 
grounds. It granted the State's motion based upon: (a) its concern that the jury not find 
out that the crime of trafficking in more than 28 grams 05 methamphetamine (the same 
crime for which Mr. Ruiz was on trial) carries a mandatory minimum fixed sentenceg; 
and (b) its balancing of that concern against Mr. Ruiz's right to attack Mr. Morrison's 
credibi~i t~. '~ (Tr., p.76, Ls.15-23; see also Tr., p.75, L.9 (precluding the defense from 
cross-examining Mr. Morrison regarding the mandatory minimum sentence for 
8 Responding to that argument, defense counsel correctly observed that the prosecutor had already 
brought up the subject of Mr. Morrison's punishment in his direct examination of Mr. Morrison. (Tr., p.74, 
Ls.18-22; see also Tr., p.60, L.16 - p.61, L.17 (Mr. Morrison's direct examination testimony wherein he 
was asked to explain some of the terms of his agreement with the State, including the State's promise to 
recommend probation).) 
9 Presumably, the district court did not want the jury to learn of the mandatory minimum fixed sentence 
that Mr. Ruiz faced for fear that the jury would find that sentence to be excessive and, thus, engage in an 
act of "nullification," i.e., acquit Mr. Ruiz without regard to the evidence. Presumably, the district court's 
concern in such a situation (as in any nullification situation) was that the jury would acquit Mr. Ruiz even if 
he was guilty. 
trafficking in more than 28 grams of methamphetamine), p.75, L.20 - p.76, L. l  (same), 
p.77, Ls.2-3 (same).) Because the district court did not articulate the legal basis for the 
balancing test ultimately employed, Mr. Ruiz can only assume that it ruled in the State's 
favor only after balancing the probative value of evidence of the mandatory minimum 
fixed sentence against some countervailing interest which is set forth in I.R.E. 403. 
However, for the reasons set forth in detail below, the district court's apparent 
analysis under Rules 401,402, and 403 was flawed. 
1. Evidence Of The Biases, Preiudices, And Ulterior Motives Of the State's 
Witnesses, Including Mr. Morrison, Is Relevant Under ldaho Rule Of 
Evidence 401 
The ldaho Rules of Evidence provide that "relevant evidence" is "evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." I.R.E. 401. Under this standard, even the district court had to recognize 
that, as a general proposition, allegations of criminal conduct against the State's 
witnesses, as well as any agreements that might exist between those witnesses and the 
State with relation to those allegations of criminal conduct, constitute "relevant 
evidence" under Rule 401 because they make it less probable that the State's witness is 
credible (see Tr., p.74, L.25 - p.75, L.8)-a fact which is always of consequence to the 
determination of the action. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 137 ldaho 671, 675, 52 P.3d 
315, 319 (2002) (finding to be relevant the fact that two government witnesses had 
grown marijuana and the government may have promised not to prosecute them in 
10 Presumably, the district court concluded that the State's interest in avoiding nullification outweighed 
Mr. Ruiz's right to fully illuminate the biases, prejudices, and ulterior motives of the key witness against 
him. 
exchange for their cooperation in the case against the defendant); cf., e.g., Davis, 415 
U.S. at 316 (in the context of the Constitutional right to confrontation, holding that "[tlhe 
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as 
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony"') (quoting 3A J. 
, p.775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). Thus, the contours of 
Mr. Morrison's deal with the State and, in particular, the details of the benefits he was to 
receive for his testimony against Mr. Ruiz, are plainly relevant. 
2. The Probative Value Of Evidence Of The Biases, Prejudices. And Ulterior 
Motives Of The State's Witnesses Is Not Substantiallv Outweighed BV Anv 
Recoqnized Countervailina Interests Of The State And. Thus, That 
Evidence Was Admissible Under ldaho Rules Of Evidence 402 And 403 
The ldaho Rules of Evidence provide that "[alll relevant evidence is admissible 
except as otherwise provided" by the other Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 402. One of the 
Rules which places a limitation on the admission of relevant evidence is Rule 403, 
which provides that relevant "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. 
In this case, the district court did not make any explicit finding that the probative 
value of evidence of the mandatory minimum fixed sentence which Mr. Morrison dodged 
by testifying against Mr. Ruiz was substantially outweighed by any of the countervailing 
interests identified in Rule 403; nevertheless, as noted above, the district court appears 
to have undertaken a Rule 403-type of analysis in precluding the defense from inquiring 
about the mandatory minimum fixed sentence avoided. (See Tr.. p.76, Ls.15-23.) As 
set forth below, to the extent that the district court did undertake an analysis under Rule 
403, its conclusion represents an abuse of discretion. 
While Rule 403 identifies six State interests which, if they substantially outweigh 
the probative value of the evidence in question, could support a decision to exclude that 
evidence, none of those interests is particularly significant, and certainly none of them 
substantially outweigh the probative value of Mr. Morrison's testimony about the 
mandatory minimum sentence at issue. As was alluded to in Part C above, there was 
tremendous probative value to evidence of Mr. Morrison's understanding about the 
mandatory minimum he faced on the trafficking charge. Had Mr. Ruiz been allowed to 
ask Mr. Morrison the critical questions that would have allowed the jury to understand 
why delivery of methamphetamine was considered a "lesser" charge, and to 
comprehend just how significant it is for a defendant to have his charge reduced from 
trafficking in more than 28 grams of methamphetamine to mere delivery of 
methamphetamine, it could have appreciated the fact that Mr. Morrison had a uniquely 
compelling incentive to make every effort to try to please the State. 
As for the countervailing interests identified in Rule 403, the cross-examination 
Mr. Ruiz sought clearly would not have caused an undue delay or wasted any time 
because questioning Mr. Morrison about his understanding of the mandatory minimum 
sentence at issue would have taken mere seconds-surely much less time than was 
spent arguing over whether Mr. Ruiz should be allowed to so inquire; it clearly would not 
have resulted in the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence" because the 
mandatory minimum had not yet come up; and it clearly would not have misled the jury 
or confused the issues because there is nothing misleading or confusing about the fact 
that Mr. Morrison avoided a mandatory three years in a state prison by testifying against 
Mr. Ruiz (in fact, as noted, the cross-examination would have actually assisted the jury 
by explaining why the prosecutor referred to delivery charge as a "lesser" charge). 
Moreover, while the district appears to have been concerned about the risk of unfair 
te, i.e., jury nullification, that concern was ill-founded for two 
reasons. First, the district court was willing to allow the jury to hear about the maximum 
punishment for trafficking in methamphetamine (see, e.g., p.74, L.25 - p.75, L.4), so the 
risk of jury nullification would be present (to a certain extent) anyway. Second, and 
more importantly, any concern that the district court had about jury nullification ought to 
have been alleviated by the fact that it had given pre-proof jury instructions which 
included the following admonition: "Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty 
or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect your verdict. . . ." (Instruction 
No. 9"; see also Tr., p.9, L.8 (indicating the district court's reading of the pre-proof 
instructions).) Although there was no reason why that instruction would not have been 
sufficient, see State v. Trejo, 132 Idaho 872, 879, 979 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(recognizing a presumption that jurors follow the instructions they are given), if the 
district court was concerned that its pre-proof instruction would be flatly ignored by the 
jury, it could have admonished the jurors again-either while Mr. Morrison was on the 
witness stand, or prior to the jury's deliberation. 
Because there was a great deal of probative value to evidence of the mandatory 
minimum fixed sentence that Mr. Morrison would have faced had he not testified for the 
State, and because there was no legitimate interest in keeping that evidence from the 
jury, it simply cannot be said that the probative value of that evidence was "substantially 
~~~ 
11 The jury instructions are included as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. 
outweighed" by any of the countervailing interests identified in Rule 403. Thus, the 
district court abused its discretion in precluding Mr. Ruiz from cross-examining 
Mr. Morrison as to that mandatory minimum fixed sentence. 
E. The District Court's Error In Preventina Mr. Ruiz From Fully Cross-Examining A 
Key Prosecution Witness Was Not "Harmless" And. Thus, Mr. Ruiz Is Entitled To 
A New Trial 
Admittedly, "the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant [only] to a fair trial, not 
a perfect one." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681. Thus, not all trial errors--or even all 
constitutional trial errors-require reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id. Some 
errors may be so minor in terms of their effect on the factfinding process that they may 
be deemed to "harmless." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
In determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the reviewing court 
determines whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. "To say that an error did not 
contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else 
the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." Yafes v. Evatt, 
500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). The issue is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the inadmissible evidence. Id. 
at 404-05. "The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty 
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
In accordance with Chapman, upon finding that the district court erred in failing to 
allow Mr. Ruiz to fully cross-examine Mr. Morrison regarding Mr. Morrison's biases, 
prejudices, and ulterior motives, this Court must next determine whether the jury's guilty 
verdict in this case was surely unattributable to the district court's error and was 
therefore harmless. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232-33; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681-684; 
Green, 136 Idaho at 557-58, 38 P.3d at 136-37. Mr. Ruiz submits that this Court can 
reach no such conclusion. As noted in Mr. Ruiz's statement of facts, the only evidence 
linking Mr. Ruiz to the controlled buys in this case was the testimony of two individuals: 
Mr. Morrison and Ms. Larsen. The testimony of both of these individuals, however, is 
highly suspect since both of them had incentive to misidentify Mr. Ruiz as their drug 
supplier in an effort to please the State and, thereby, gain more favorable treatment for 
themselves. If the jury had been allowed to hear about the mandatory minimum fixed 
sentence that Mr. Morrison avoided by testifying against Mr. Ruiz, it might very well 
have disbelieved Mr. Morrison's testimony and, not finding Ms. Larsen's questionable 
testimony to be sufficient to maintain a guilty verdict on its own, it may very well have 
acquitted Mr. Ruiz. See Olden, 488 U.S. at 232-33 (finding reversible error under 
Chapman where the trial court had precluded the defendant from cross-examining the 
complaining witness about her motive to prevent false testimony); Davis, 415 U.S. at 
317-21 (not explicitly applying Chapman, but nevertheless finding reversible error where 
the trial court had precluded the defendant from cross-examining a key prosecution 
witness about his motives to misidentify the defendant). Accordingly, Mr. Ruiz asserts 
that he is entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ruiz respectfully requests that his conviction and 
sentence be vacated, and his case remanded for a new trial 
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